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bstract
This paper extends Evans and Jovanovic (1989)’s entrepreneurship model to incorporate the informal sector. Specifically,
ntrepreneurs can operate either in the formal sector – in which they have limited access to credit markets and must pay taxes
 or in the informal sector – in which they can avoid paying taxes, but have no access to credit markets. In addition, technology
n the informal sector is both less productive and more labor intensive than that in the formal sector. We calibrate the model to the
razilian economy, and evaluate the impact of credit frictions and taxation on occupational choices, aggregate output and inequality.
emoving all distortions can improve aggregate efficiency considerably, largely because this induces entrepreneurs to switch to
he formal sector, where the technology is superior. Most of this effect comes from removing credit market frictions, but taxes on
ormal businesses are also important. The elimination of distortions can also reduce income inequality substantially.
 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: E26; L26; O17
eywords: Informal sector; Credit frictions; Taxation; Entrepreneurship
esumo
Este trabalho incorpora o setor informal ao modelo de empreendedorismo de Evans e Jovanovic (1989). Especificamente,
mpreendedores podem operar no setor formal - com acesso limitado ao mercado de crédito e sujeitos a cobranc¸a de impostos
 ou no setor informal - evitando a tributac¸ão, mas sem acesso a crédito. Adicionalmente, a tecnologia no setor informal é menos
rodutiva e mais intensiva em trabalho. O modelo é calibrado com base em dados da economia brasileira. Avaliam-se os efeitos
e tributos e de restric¸ões no mercado de crédito sobre as escolhas ocupacionais, produc¸ão agregada e desigualdade. A remoc¸ão
e todas as distorc¸ões melhora a eficiência agregada de maneira considerável, principalmente por conta da migrac¸ão de agentes
ara o empreendedorismo formal, que opera com uma tecnologia superior. A restric¸ão de crédito possui o maior efeito, mas os We thank Gabriel Madeira, Enlinson Mattos and Vladimir Teles for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from FAPESP is
ratefully acknowledged.
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impostos sobre empresas formais também têm papel importante. A eliminac¸ão de distorc¸ões ainda permite reduzir substancialmente
a desigualdade de renda no modelo.
© 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
Palavras-chave: Setor informal; Restric¸ões de crédito; Taxac¸ão; Empreendedorismo
1.  Introduction
Large informal sectors are a distinctive feature of developing economies.1 Firms operate informally as a means
of avoiding regulations and taxation. However, there are costs to this action, such as lack of access to formal credit
markets and to the legal system. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that firms in the informal sector are also less
productive (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).
In the present paper, we explore some elements of this tradeoff by embedding a standard entrepreneurship model
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) with an informal sector. Specifically, there are two sectors: the formal sector and the
informal sector. In the formal sector, entrepreneurs have imperfect access to credit markets and have to pay taxes, while
in the informal sector they can evade the payment of taxes but are barred from credit markets. Furthermore, technology
is less efficient and more labor intensive in the informal sector.
Agents are heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial talent and wealth. Based on this, they decide between three occu-
pations: wage working, entrepreneurship in the formal sector and entrepreneurship in the informal sector. Differently
from Evans and Jovanovic, we also allow wages to be endogenous, which gives rise to nontrivial effects on income
distribution.2 We calibrate the model to approximate features of the Brazilian economy, and evaluate the effects of
taxation and credit constraints on efficiency (aggregate output), formalization and inequality.
Taken together, the frictions included in the model are able to generate substantial inefficiency. Particularly, in
our basic calibration, aggregate output is 37 percent below that of an undistorted economy. Most of this gap comes
from credit constraints on formal entrepreneurs: removing this friction (holding taxes constant) reduces the level of
inefficiency to about 10 percent. Taxation on formal businesses also has an important impact on output: inefficiency is
more than halved when we equal such taxes to zero. These effects come largely from the migration of entrepreneurs
from the informal to the formal sector, where productivity is higher.
We also evaluate how taxes on labor income (uniform across sectors) affect total output. Reducing such taxes can
actually make the economy less efficient (although the effect is small in magnitude), since it lowers gross wages, thus
making the informal sector (which is labor intensive) more attractive.
Removing all frictions also reduces income inequality in the model. Both tax rates are the main driver behind this
effect. Removing borrowing constraints also contributes to lower inequality, but the magnitude of the effect is much
smaller than that of eliminating tax rates.
Our work is related to a large literature that evaluates the effect of credit market frictions on entrepreneurship (see
for instance Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Paulson and Townsend, 2004; Buera, 2008).
Our main contribution is to add two different sectors (formal and informal) to the classic model of Evans and Jovanovic.
This allows us to analyze not only the effect of credit constraints, but also of taxation. Moreover, these effects can be
larger than in a model with a single sector, since changes in parameters induce individuals to switch sectors that have
different technologies.
The focus on efficiency is motivated by the literature on misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007; Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008), especially Jeong and Townsend (2007) and Banerjee and Moll (2010), which analyze the effect of
credit market frictions on aggregate productivity. Regarding the effect on inequality, our work is particularly related
to Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Once more, considering the informal sector can amplify the effect of such frictions,
since they influence the sector (and therefore technology) in which individuals choose to operate. The present study is
1 See, for instance, Schneider (2005, 2012).
2 Gasperini (2010) also considers endogenous wages in Evans and Jovanovic’s model.
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lso related to papers that model the informal sector, such as Rauch (1991), Amaral and Quintin (2006), Antunes and
avalcanti (2007), D’Erasmo and Moscoso-Boedo (2012), De Paula and Scheinkman (2011) and Ordonez (2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 explains how the model was
alibrated to the Brazilian economy. Section 4 presents simulations regarding changes in credit frictions and taxation,
nd analyzes the effects on efficiency, occupational choice and inequality. Section 5 concludes.
.  Model
Our starting point is the model proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Specifically, there is a set of individuals,
eterogeneous in their wealth and entrepreneurial talent. Each of them chooses either to be an entrepreneur or a wage
orker. To become an entrepreneur, the individual may need to borrow resources. The presence of borrowing constraints
hen implies that occupational choice depends not only on entrepreneurial talent, but also on wealth.
We add to Evans and Jovanovic (1989) by introducing two different sectors in which the entrepreneur can operate:
he formal sector and the informal sector. In the former, the entrepreneur may borrow a limited amount of resources to
nance her business but has to pay taxes, whereas in the informal sector the individual can evade the payment of taxes,
ut has to rely exclusively on her wealth (she has no access to credit markets). We consider a small open economy, so
hat the interest rate is exogenously fixed. Nonetheless, differently from Evans and Jovanovic (1989), wages are set
ccording to a market clearing condition.
.1.  Technology
There is a continuum of mass 1 of individuals, which are heterogeneous in two dimensions: entrepreneurial talent
 θ ∈  [0, ∞) – and wealth – z  ∈  [0, ∞). They are distributed in the population according to the pdf f(θ, z). Output is
omogeneous and may be either produced in the formal sector or in the informal sector. An entrepreneur of talent θ
perating in the formal sector combines capital (Kf) and labor (Lf) to generate output using the following technology:
Yf =  θ
(
KαfL
1−α
f
)γ
here γ  ∈  (0, 1) is the span of control parameter, as in Lucas (1978). For this same entrepreneur, production in the
nformal sector is given by:
Yi =  ψθ
(
K
β
i L
1−β
i
)γ
here Ki and Li stand for the amounts of capital and labor employed by the entrepreneur in this sector, and ψ  is a
arameter that does not depend on θ. We assume 0 < ψ  < 1 and β  < α, that is, production in the informal sector is both
ess efficient and more labor intensive.3
.2.  The  formal  sector
If a person decides to be an entrepreneur in the formal sector, she may need external funds to finance her capital.
owever, there are credit constraints: an agent can borrow up to a multiple of her wealth. Specifically, an individual
ith wealth z  is able to borrow at most (λ  −  1)z, where λ  ∈ [1, ∞) is a parameter that measures how lax is the
orrowing constraint. The entrepreneur then has this amount plus her own wealth – that is, (λ  −  1)z  + z  = λz  – available
or investment. This implies that the capital stock employed by her firm (Kf) cannot exceed λz.
Net earnings of a formal entrepreneur with wealth z  and talent θ are given by:
πf (θ,  z) =  max {(1 −  τf )θ(KαL1−α)γ −  wLf −  r(Kf −  z) + T  : 0 ≤  Kf ≤  λz}
Kf ,Lf
f f
here τf is the tax rate on output (if produced in the formal sector), w  is the wage rate, r  −  1 is the real interest rate
nd T is a lump-sum transfer. Tax revenues are distributed uniformly across the population in a lump-sum fashion. In
3 We follow Amaral and Quintin (2006) when assuming that the informal sector is labor intensive.
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other words, T  depends neither on the person’s characteristics, nor on her occupation. If the borrowing constraint does
not bind (unconstrained entrepreneur), optimality conditions imply that:
K∗fu =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣ γθ(1 −  τf )( r
α
)1−(1−α)γ( w
1 −  α
)(1−α)γ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
1/(1−γ)
L∗fu =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣ γθ(1 −  τf )( r
α
)αγ( w
1 −  α
)1−αγ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
1/(1−γ)
which are the amounts of capital and labor chosen by an unconstrained entrepreneur. In this case, the individual uses
the efficient quantities of both inputs, and her choice does not depend on wealth. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur
is constrained, we have that:
K∗fc =  λz
L∗fc =
[
γθ(1 −  τf )(1 −  α)(λz)αγ
w
]1/(1−α(1−γ))
Therefore, if the constraint binds, the entrepreneur’s wealth affects the scale of her enterprise. The optimal choice
of inputs by an entrepreneur in the formal sector can then be expressed as:
K∗f =
{
λz, if K∗fu >  λz
K∗fu, otherwise
L∗f =
{
L∗fc,  if K∗fu >  λz
L∗fu otherwise
2.3.  The  informal  sector
The entrepreneur in the informal sector has a problem analogous to that in the formal sector with two key differences:
(i) she can evade the payment of taxes (τf = 0), and (ii) she has no access to credit markets, having only her own wealth
to use as capital (λ  = 1). Net earnings are thus given by:
πi(θ,  z) =  max
Ki,Li
{θψ(Kβi L1−βi )
γ −  wLi −  r(Ki −  z) +  T  : 0 ≤  Ki ≤  z}
The optimal choice of inputs by an unconstrained entrepreneur is then:
K∗iu =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣ γψθ( r
β
)1−(1−β)γ(
w
1 −  β
)(1−β)γ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
1/(1−γ)
⎡
⎢⎢ γψθ
⎤
⎥⎥
1/(1−γ)L∗iu = ⎢⎣( r
β
)βγ(
w
1 −  β
)1−βγ ⎥⎦
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hile a constrained entrepreneur chooses:
K∗ic =  z
L∗ic =
[
γψθ(1 −  α)zβγ
w
]1/(1−β(1−γ))
The optimal decision of an entrepreneur in the informal sector is then summarized by:
K∗i =
{
z, if K∗iu >  z
K∗iu,  otherwise
L∗i =
{
L∗ic, if K∗iu >  z
L∗iu,  otherwise
.4.  Wage  worker
A person who decides to be a wage worker receives the wage (net of taxes), the lump-sum transfer and interest on
er wealth. Each wage worker supplies one unit of time inelastically. In other words, labor income does not depend
n entrepreneurial talent. Following Amaral and Quintin (2006), we suppose no segmentation in the labor market, so
hat wages are equalized across sectors. Net earnings of a wage worker with wealth z  are then:
πw(z) =  (1 −  τn)w  +  rz  +  T
here τn is the tax rate on labor income.4
.5.  Equilibrium
The decision of each agent is static. Given talent and wealth, she chooses the occupation which gives her the
ighest net income: wage worker, entrepreneur in the formal sector, or entrepreneur in the informal sector. Therefore,
(θ, z) =  max{πf (θ,  z),  πi(θ,  z),  πw(z)}  are the net earnings of an individual with wealth z  and talent θ. The fraction
f agents opting for each occupation j  ∈  {f,  i,  w}  is:
Oj =
∫ ∫
1{π(θ,  z) =  πj(θ,  z)}f  (θ,  z)dθdz
here the subscripts f, i and w  stand for entrepreneur in the formal sector, entrepreneur in informal sector and wage
orker, respectively. The equilibrium wage is such that:
Of +  Oi +  Ow =  1
nd that the supply of labor from wage workers (left-hand side of the equation below) is equal to the demand for labor
rom formal and informal entrepreneurs (right-hand side):
Ow =
∫ ∫
1{π(θ, z) =  πf (θ,  z)}L∗f f  (θ,  z)dθdz  +
∫ ∫
1{π(θ, z) =  πi(θ,  z)}L∗i f  (θ,  z)dθdz
Furthermore, since tax revenues are transferred back uniformly to the agents, we have that:
T =
∫ ∫
1{π(θ, z) =  πf (θ,  z)}τf θ
(
K∗αL∗1−α
)γ
f (θ,  z)dθdz  +  Owτnwf f
here the terms on the right-hand side are the proceeds from taxation on formal entrepreneurs and on labor income,
espectively.
4 In the model τf drives the wedge across sectors. We assume that the tax on labor income is uniform across sectors (that is, it has to be paid
ndependently of the sector the worker chooses), so that τn does not capture this wedge as well.
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Table 1
Parameter values.
Parameter Description Value Source
λ Borrowing constraint parameter 2 Paulson et al. (2006)
τn Tax rate on labor income 0.176 Pereira and Ellery (2011)
τf Tax rate on formal businesses 0.317 Prado (2011)
α Formal sector technology parameter 0.35 Data on labor share and share of informal output
β Informal sector technology parameter 0.25 Data on labor share and share of informal output
ψ Informal sector technology parameter 0.7 –
γ Span of control parameter 0.65 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), Hsieh and Klenow (2007)
r Real interest rate (plus 1) 1.0795 Average for Brazil (2003–2009)3.  Calibration
Our main objective is to understand the effects of taxation and borrowing constraints on occupational choice,
aggregate efficiency and inequality, in an environment in which a significant fraction of output is produced in the
informal sector. To do so, we calibrate the model to approximate some features of the Brazilian economy. Along with
values for the model’s parameters, we need functional forms for the distributions of wealth and entrepreneurial talent.
3.1.  Parameter  values
Table 1 presents our baseline calibration for the model’s parameters. Some of these values were chosen in conformity
with the literature, while others were set to replicate features of the Brazilian economy. Specifically, we choose λ  = 2
for our borrowing constraint parameter, which means that the amount borrowed by a formal entrepreneur cannot be
larger than the value of her own wealth. This value is in line with Paulson et al. (2006)’s study on the Thai economy.
Regarding the span of control parameter, we choose γ  = 0.65, which is the average of the values used by Hsieh and
Klenow (2007) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) – respectively, 0.5 and 0.8. Further, we set α = 0.35 and β  = 0.25. In the
model, the labor share is given by:5
γ(1 −  α)
[
1 − Yi
Y
]
+  γ(1 −  β)Yi
Y
where Yi/Y  is the share of informal output on total output, which is estimated to be 0.39 for the Brazilian economy
(Schneider, 2012). Given this, our choice of parameters yields a labor share of 44.8%. According Brazil’s National
Accounts, compensation of employees is 41% of GDP (average for the period 2003–2009).6
The parameter ψ  is set at 0.7. This value guarantees that both sectors are active in our baseline calibration. Tax
rates on wages and formal output were set at τn = 0.176 and τf = 0.317. These values were estimated for the Brazilian
economy respectively by Pereira and Ellery (2011) and Prado (2011). Finally, based on the average Brazilian real
7interest rate between 2003 and 2009, we set r  = 1.0795.
5 The labor share in the formal sector is γ(1 − α), that is, the exponent on labor in the production function of that sector. Analogously, γ(1 − β) is
the labor share in the informal sector. The economywide labor share is the weighted average of sectoral labor shares, where the weights are given
by the share of each sector in total output Y.
6 Labor share estimates are usually adjusted to include a fraction of self-employment income, especially for developing countries (see Gollin,
2002). Here we do not make such adjustment, since we view self-employment income as entreprenuerial income.
7 To calculate the annual real interest rate, we use the short-term nominal interest rate (the SELIC rate, which is targeted by Brazilian Central
Bank for monetary policy purposes) in annual terms, minus the annual rate of CPI inflation (IPCA).
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.1.1.  Distribution  of  wealth  and  entrepreneurial  talent
We suppose that wealth and talent are independently distributed. Regarding wealth, we choose a log-normal dis-
ribution, i.e., log z∼N(μz, σ2z ). The standard deviation σz can be mapped into the Gini index through the following
ormula:
Gini  =  2(σz/
√
2) −  1
here (·) is the cdf of the normal distribution. To our knowledge there are no wealth surveys in Brazil, which could
rovide direct estimates of the wealth Gini index. Davies et al. (2011) use data from countries with wealth surveys to
roject the wealth Gini coefficient of other countries. For Brazil, their estimate is 0.784. We use this value to calibrate
z = 1.75.
Entrepreneurial talent is an unobservable variable. Our strategy is to assume a uniform distribution – θ  ∼  U(0, A) –
nd calibrate the parameter A, along with the parameter μz from the wealth distribution, to approximate two statistics
Fig. 2. Occupational choices (introducing the informal sector).
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Table 2
Occupational choices (%).
Wage workers Formal entrepreneurs Informal entrepreneurs
All Constrained Unconstrained All Constrained Unconstrained
Share in population 65.6 17.9 14.3 3.6 16.5 8.5 8.0
Mean talent 5.9 14.6 14.8 14.3 14.3 15.8 14.0
Mean wealth 5.4 1.8 0.9 2.3 12.5 0.7 15.7Share in output 59.0 53.4 5.6 41.0 17.0 24.0
Share in employment 48.3 45.1 3.2 51.7 16.8 34.9
from the Brazilian economy: (i) the share of informal output in total GDP – 39% according to Schneider (2012); and
(ii) the share of wage workers in total employment – 63.8% according the Brazilian Household Survey (average for
the 2003–2009 period).8 Specifically, we set μz = 0.2 and A = 17.6, which produce a share of informal output in total
GDP of 41% and a share of wage workers in the population of 65.6% in the model.
4.  Simulations
Our simulations are based on a random draw of 100,000 individuals from the distributions of talent and wealth
described above. Before turning to the quantitative implications of the model, we provide some intuition on its inner
workings, particularly regarding the effects of credit constraints and taxation on occupational choice.
Fig. 1(a) plots agents according to their characteristics and occupational choices, in an environment with no taxes
(τf = τn = 0) and no credit constraints on formal entrepreneurs (λ  =∞). In this case, all entrepreneurs operate in the
formal sector. Moreover, occupational choice depends only on talent: if θ is sufficiently high, the individual becomes
an entrepreneur; otherwise, she chooses to be a wage worker.
Fig. 1(b) introduces the borrowing constraint on formal entrepreneurs. We keep tax rates at zero, so that it is still
not optimal to operate in the informal sector. This is the case studied by Evans and Jovanovic (the only difference here
is that wages are endogenous). Now occupational choice depends on wealth as well as talent. In particular, there are
two margins of inefficiency entailed by the borrowing constraint: (i) the intensive margin, that is, individuals with high
θ and low z become constrained entrepreneurs and have to operate at scales lower than optimal; and (ii) the extensive
margin, that is, some of these high-talent individuals prefer to become wage workers. These effects also reduce the
demand for labor and, therefore, equilibrium wages.
Fig. 2 introduces, in addition to credit constraints, the second source of friction in the model: taxes on formal
entrepreneurs and on labor income. Now the informal sector becomes profitable for some individuals, since they can
avoid paying taxes. In particular, for a given level of wealth, the least talented individuals opt for wage working.
Increases in talent then induce individuals to become informal entrepreneurs: since their scale is relatively low, they
prefer to operate informally in spite of not having access to credit markets. Further increases in θ  (for the same level of
z) are then related to larger scale: access to credit markets becomes essential, thus inducing such individuals to operate
in the formal sector.
This reasoning applies to intermediate values of θ, such as θ = 4 in Fig. 2. However, there is also a set of highly talented
individuals that operate informally, specifically those with very low levels of wealth (upper left corner of Fig. 2). If these
individuals were to operate in the formal sector, they would raise a very limited amount of resources and, therefore,
produce with substantially low capital. That would be particularly costly since the formal sector features a capital
intensive technology. These individuals therefore prefer the informal sector, in which technology is labor intensive
(although inferior) and they do not have to pay taxes.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about our calibrated economy. About 65.6 percent of all individuals
are wage workers, and 17.9 percent are entrepreneurs operating in the formal sector. The informal sector employs the
8 Data from the Brazilian Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio, PNAD), calculated annually by the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We use only individuals that are employers, employees or self-employed, with ages 10 or more. The share of
wage workers is the number of employees divided by the sum of employees, employers and self-employed.
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Table 3
Effect of taxes and borrowing constraints on efficiency (%).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τn = 0 τn = 0.176 τn = 0 τn = 0.176
τf = 0 τf = 0 τf = 0.345 τf = 0.345
λ =∞ – 0.3 10.6 10.8
λ
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d = 2 17.3 17.4 38.0 37.0
 = 1 24.3 24.4 50.0 51.0
ajority of workers (51.7%), but produces only 41 percent of the output in this economy. This is because such sector
s both more labor intensive and less productive than the formal sector. Wage workers are the least talented individuals
f this economy, while formal entrepreneurs are slightly more talented than informal ones on average. Nonetheless,
nformal entrepreneurs are wealthier, especially those unconstrained: since these individuals do not need to borrow to
perate at the optimal scale, they choose the informal sector in order to avoid paying taxes.
.1.  Implications  for  efﬁciency
To measure efficiency, we compare our model’s total output (formal and informal) to that of an economy with no
istortions. Specifically, let Y(λ, τf, τn) be the total output of an economy with parameters λ, τf and τn. Output in the
bsence of distortions is given by Y(∞, 0, 0). We define efficiency gap as 1 −  Y(λ, τf, τn)/Y(∞, 0, 0).
Table 3 displays the efficiency gap for selected combinations of tax rates and borrowing constraint parameters. In
olumn (1), both tax rates are zero. Column (2) considers the case in which taxes on formal output are null, but the tax
ate on labor income is positive. Column (3) does the opposite, i.e., allows taxes on formal output to be positive, but
eeps taxes on labor income at zero. Finally, in column (4) both tax rates are positive. As for the borrowing constraint
arameter, along with our calibrated value (λ  = 2), we consider two extreme situations: λ =∞  (that is, without such
onstraint) and λ  = 1 (that is, no access to credit markets, even for formal entrepreneurs).9
The efficiency gap of our calibrated economy is highlighted in bold. The combination of taxes and borrowing
onstraints generates an efficiency loss of 37 percent, relative to an economy with no distortions. Most of this effect
s attributed to borrowing constraints: the efficiency loss is reduced to 10.8 percent, when we make such constraint
nimportant (that is, when λ  is increased from 2 to infinity), while keeping tax rates constant.
Though smaller in magnitude, the effect of taxes on total output is also substantial: the efficiency loss falls to 17.3
ercent when one makes both tax rates equal to zero, but keeps λ  = 2 (column (4) versus column (1)). This effect is
asically driven by taxes on formal output (column (4) versus column (2)). When one reduces only the tax rate on
abor income to zero (column (4) versus column (3)), the efficiency gap actually increases. This is because the fall
n τn lowers gross wages, thus making the informal sector (which is labor intensive) more attractive. In other words,
ome entrepreneurs migrate to the informal sector, which is also less productive, leading to a fall in total output.
Notice that this negative effect of τn is absent in the extreme situations λ  = 1 and λ  =∞. The reason is that, in these
ases, the movement of entrepreneurs across sectors is severely reduced. For instance, when λ  = 1, there is no incentive
o operate formally, since entrepreneurs do not have access to credit markets in either sector (but in the informal sector
hey do not pay taxes). Therefore, changes in τn will not entail movements of individuals across sectors. Similarly,
hen λ  =∞, there is little incentive to operate informally, which reduces the mass of individuals reacting to an increase
n τn.10
In what follows, we provide further details on the mechanisms behind the effects tax rates and the borrowing
onstraint parameter on efficiency..1.1. Changes  in  λ
We now analyze the impacts of changing the borrowing constraint parameter on formalization and efficiency. Table 4
isplays percentage changes in total output (relative to our baseline calibration, i.e., λ  = 2) for selected values of the
9 In all exercises, informal entreprenuers have no access to credit markets.
10 In these cases, a high τn leads to inefficiency because it distorts the choice between wage working and entreprenuership.
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Table 4
Effects of changing the borrowing constraint parameter (%).
 1.0 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5 3.0
Total output −22.2 −16.5 −5.5 – 3.3 6.1 21.3
Intensive margin −3.3 −4.3 −1.6 – 1.0 2.2 10.4
Extensive margin −18.9 −12.2 −3.9 – 2.2 3.8 10.9
Share of informal output 100.0 80.9 52.1 41.0 35.9 32.3 8.8
Occupational choices
Wage workers 66.5 66.2 65.8 65.6 65.6 65.6 65.1
Formal entrepreneurs 0.0 4.1 13.1 17.9 20.3 21.7 31.0
Informal entrepreneurs 33.5 29.7 21.2 16.5 14.1 12.7 3.9
Table 5
Effects of changing taxation on formal businesses (%).
f (%) 29.7 30.7 31.2 31.7 32.2 32.7 33.7
Total output 23.4 22.5 21.8 – −5.1 −10.4 −22.8
Intensive margin 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.0 −0.0 −0.0
Extensive margin 23.4 22.4 21.8 −5.1 −10.4 −22.8
Share of informal output 0.7 1.8 2.7 41.0 52.2 65.0 99.8
Occupational choices
Wage workers 64.5 64.6 64.6 65.6 65.8 65.9 66.0
Formal entrepreneurs 34.8 33.7 33.0 17.9 14.1 9.9 0.5
Informal entrepreneurs 0.7 1.7 2.5 16.5 20.1 24.2 33.5
borrowing constraint parameter. We also show the share of output produced in the informal sector, as well as the share
of each occupation in the population. Tax rates are kept at their baseline values.
Increasing λ  implies that individuals in the formal sector have more access to credit. This sector, as a result, becomes
more attractive, leading to a decrease in informal output. Total output rises because of two channels: (i) the intensive
margin, that is, individuals that maintain their statuses of formal entrepreneurs (constrained) and can expand their scale
since there is more credit available, and (ii) the extensive margin, that is, individuals that switch from the other two
occupations and become formal entrepreneurs.
Table 4 also decomposes the impact on total output into these two margins.11 For instance, raising λ from 2 to 2.5
leads to a 6.1 percent increase in total output; the share of informal sector decreases from 41 to 32.3%. This effect
comes mostly from the extensive margin, i.e., from individuals that become formal entrepreneurs as a result of an
increase λ  – specifically from entrepreneurs that leave the informal sector, since the share of wage workers is relatively
constant across different values of λ.
However, the intensive margin becomes more important as λ increases further. For instance, for λ  = 3, this margin
accounts for more than half of the total effect on output. This is intuitive: for high values of λ  most of entrepreneurs
are already in the formal sector. Further increases in this parameter, therefore, can induce the migration of very few
extra entrepreneurs, thus reducing the relative importance of the extensive margin.124.1.2.  Changes  in  τf
Table 5 performs a similar exercise, but for changes in τf. As a result of increasing taxes on formal businesses, some
individuals find more profitable to operate informally. Therefore, output in the informal sector rises at the expense of
11 To calculate the intensive margin, we add the change in output across entreprenuers that did not alter their occupational choices as a result of a
different value for λ. The intensive margin is the change in production from entreprenuers that did alter their statuses.
12 Notice from Table 4 that the intensive margin increases as λ rises, except when λ falls from 1.5 to 1.0. In such region, there are few formal
entreprenuers, so that their contribution to the intensive margin is quite limited. On the other hand, reducing λ from 1.5 to 1.0 leads to a fall in the
wage (see Section 4.2), which lowers costs especially in the informal sector (which is labor intensive), allowing existing informal firms to expand
their production. As a result, the intensive margin rises when λ falls from 1.5 to 1.0.
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Table 6
Effects of changing taxation on labor income (%).
n (%) 5.6 11.6 14.6 17.6 20.6 23.6 29.6
Total output −1.1 −0.6 −0.3 – 0.7 7.0 20.6
Intensive margin 0.5 0.6 0.1 – −0.3 −3.5 −8.2
Extensive margin −1.6 −1.2 −0.4 1.0 10.5 28.9
Share of informal output 43.9 42.7 41.9 41.0 39.7 26.8 3.6
Occupational choices
Wage workers 67.6 66.7 66.2 65.6 65.0 64.2 62.3
Formal entrepreneurs 16.1 16.9 17.4 17.9 18.6 23.5 34.3
Informal entrepreneurs 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4 12.3 3.4
Table 7
Effect of taxes and borrowing constraints on inequality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τn = 0 τn = 0.176 τn = 0 τn = 0.176
τf = 0 τf = 0 τf = 0.317 τf = 0.317
λ =∞ 0.391 0.417 0.470 0.493
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rλ = 2 0.434 0.458 0.495 0.517
λ = 1 0.454 0.477 0.494 0.516
utput in the formal sector. Moreover, nearly 100% of such effect comes from the extensive margin. Notice that the
odel is quite sensitive in this dimension.13 For instance, if τf rises by 0.5 percentage points, the informal sector share
n total output jumps from 41 to 52.2%. Total output falls as a result, as some entrepreneurs switch to a less productive
echnology when they move to the informal sector. The share of wage workers also increases in response to higher
axation on formal entrepreneurs. This is because the expansion of the informal sector (which is labor intensive) is
ssociated with an increase in wages. As a result, some individuals switch to this occupation.
.1.3. Changes  in  τn
Table 6 exhibits results regarding changes in labor income taxation. As previously noted, an increase in τn raises
fficiency, because it makes gross wages higher and, as a result, reduces relative profitability in the informal sector
which is more labor intensive). This induces some entrepreneurs to move to the formal sector, where the technology
s more productive. Such effect appears in the extensive margin, which is positive for increases in τn. The intensive
argin, nonetheless, works in the opposite way, since entrepreneurs that do not switch sectors face higher costs, thus
educing their scale. Moreover, net wages fall, leading to a reduction in the share of individuals that opt for wage
orking.
In spite of the efficiency gains, increasing labor taxation worsens income inequality in the model, since most
ndividuals are wage workers. In the following subsection, we discuss the distributional effects of changes in taxation
nd in the borrowing constraint parameter.
.2.  Implications  for  inequality
We measure inequality by the income Gini coefficient, which is equal to 0.517 in our baseline calibration. In other
ords, the model is able to generate considerable inequality, despite not featuring differences in labor productivity
in the data, the average Brazilian Gini index is equal to 0.562 during the 2003–2009 period). Table 7 is analogous to
able 3, but shows the effects of tax rates and the borrowing constraint parameter on income inequality in the model.
f all distortions were removed, the Gini index would drop to 0.391. Eliminating each distortion separately would also
educe inequality in the model. The highest reduction occurs when one makes tax rates equal to zero.
13 For this reason, we chose values of τf very close to each other in Table 5.
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Fig. 3. Effect of borrowing constraint parameter on inequality.
Furthermore, notice that the parameter λ  has a non-monotonic effect on the Gini coefficient: raising λ  from 1 to 2
increases income inequality, but increasing λ  further to infinity reduces this index. Fig. 3 shows the Gini coefficient
for several values of λ  (tax rates remain constant at their baseline values). The relationship follows an inverted “U”
shape, where inequality peaks at λ  roughly equal to 2.25.
This occurs because λ  has two effects on wages (and, therefore, inequality, since most individuals choose wage
working in this economy), which work in opposite ways. On the one hand, relaxing borrowing constraints boosts labor
demand, as firms in the formal sector are able to reach larger scales of production. On the other hand, the increase in λ
induces movements of entrepreneurs from the informal to the formal sector, which lowers labor demand since informal
firms operate a labor-intensive technology. When λ  is close to one (and nearly all output is produced in the informal
sector), the second effect dominates. As λ  increases further, the first effect becomes more important.
A smaller tax rate on labor income lowers efficiency, but reduces inequality, since the net wage increases in response
to a lower τn. On the other hand, reductions in τf lead to lower wages, since they stimulate the migration from the
informal to the formal sector (which is less labor intensive). Such effect is however quantitatively small, and a fall in
τf ends up lowering inequality. This follows because entrepreneurs move to the formal sector, where their income is
less dependent on their wealth than in the informal sector.
5.  Concluding  remarks
This paper analyzed the effects of taxation and credit market frictions on occupational choice, aggregate efficiency
and income inequality, in an environment where a large fraction of output is produced in the informal sector. In particular,
we extended the model of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) to consider two sectors: the formal sector, in which entrepreneurs
have limited access to credit markets and must pay taxes; and the informal sector, in which entrepreneurs can evade the
payment of taxes, but have to rely exclusively on their wealth to finance their capital. Individuals are heterogeneous
in their wealth and entrepreneurial talent, and decide between three occupations: wage worker, entrepreneur in the
formal and entrepreneur in the informal sector. In addition, the informal sector is both less productive and more labor
intensive than the formal sector.
The model is calibrated to approximate features of the Brazilian economy in the 2000s. For our baseline parameters,
the frictions included in the model are able to generate a considerable degree of inefficiency: total output is 37
percent below that of an economy with no distortions. This is largely attributed to credit frictions, but taxes on formal
businesses are also important. Relaxing such frictions can the have a large impact on total output, mostly because it
induces entrepreneurs to switch to the formal sector, which features a superior technology. Removing all frictions also
reduces considerably income inequality in the model.Our work leaves some interesting questions for future research. For instance, we assumed that informal entrepreneurs
cannot borrow any resources to finance their capital. One could argue that, in reality, they have some access to credit,
although at a higher cost than formal businesses. Merlin and Teles (2014) suppose that informal entrepreneurs borrow
funds through personal credit lines (at substantially higher rates than through business credit lines) to invest in their
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rms. Incorporating this feature in our setting would certainly reduce the impact of removing frictions (especially
orrowing constraints and the taxes on formal enterprises), since it would lower the incentives to operate formally. On
he other hand, this would force us to recalibrate the model, so that the share of the informal sector would approximate
hat in the data. In other words, we would have to reduce the relative efficiency parameter ψ, which would probably
ncrease aggregate inefficiency in our baseline calibration.
Another interesting extension is to endogenize wealth through savings decisions. The option to operate informally
and to not pay taxes) may induce some entrepreneurs to accumulate little wealth. This could give rise to poverty traps
nd increase even more the level of aggregate inefficiency found in model.
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